This page defines the governance voting structure of CICADA Finance, including proposal submission rules, voting thresholds, execution safeguards, proposal categories, and emergency controls.
Governance in CICADA Finance is not merely token voting. It is a structured management and constraint system covering the full lifecycle of assets, yield distribution, protocol upgrades, and risk control.
1. Governance Scope
Governance decisions may include:
Protocol parameter adjustments
Asset onboarding or removal
Treasury and ecosystem program adjustments
Cross-chain or custody integrations
Governance is designed to ensure that no single asset, strategy, or actor can exert uncontrolled systemic influence.
2. Proposal Submission Rules
2.1 Proposal Threshold
To submit an onchain proposal, the proposer must control at least:
1% of total governance voting power
This prevents spam and ensures proposers have meaningful economic alignment.
2.2 Future: Dynamic Proposal Threshold
As governance participation evolves, CICADA Finance may adopt a dynamic proposal threshold based on participation metrics to balance openness and governance stability. Parameters, if activated, will be defined through governance.
3. Voting Requirements
A proposal is valid only if total votes cast reach:
20% of total governance voting power
This ensures major decisions cannot be passed by a small minority.
3.2 Approval Requirement
If quorum is reached, a proposal passes if:
For votes > Against votes
4. Proposal Categories & Execution Timelock
To improve security and operational discipline, proposals are categorized into governance classes. Each class has a differentiated timelock.
4.1 Category A — Parameter Adjustments
Examples:
Yield distribution parameters
Operational configuration updates
Timelock:
48 hours
Rationale: Allows community review while maintaining operational efficiency.
4.2 Category B — Asset Lifecycle Decisions
Examples:
Asset removal or suspension
Timelock:
72 hours
Rationale: Asset decisions impact capital flows and require extended review.
4.3 Category C — Smart Contract Upgrades & Governance Logic Changes
Examples:
Permission structure modifications
Custody integration updates
Timelock:
120 hours
Rationale: These changes may impact systemic architecture and require enhanced scrutiny.
4.4 Category D — Emergency or Protective Proposals
Used strictly for:
Temporary pause of specific modules
Emergency proposals may follow an accelerated governance pathway but remain subject to post-action transparency and disclosure.
5. Execution Safeguards
5.1 Timelock Enforcement
All approved proposals are queued in a timelock contract prior to execution.
The timelock provides:
Security monitoring window
Risk reassessment opportunity
Technical validation checkpoint
No proposal may bypass timelock unless governed under emergency provisions.
5.2 Onchain Deterministic Execution
Execution follows exactly the payload encoded in the proposal. No discretionary modifications are permitted once approved.
6. Emergency Multi-Signature Governance Mechanism
CICADA Finance includes a multi-signature emergency mechanism for exceptional scenarios.
Governance aims to minimize discretionary intervention, but real-world risks may require immediate containment.
6.2 Scope of Emergency Authority (Strictly Limited)
The multi-signature mechanism may:
Temporarily freeze sensitive parameters
Prevent execution of a queued proposal during timelock if a critical vulnerability is discovered
Emergency controls are protective only — not discretionary governance replacements.
6.3 Transparency Requirements
Emergency actions must:
Be executed onchain where possible
Be accompanied by post-incident disclosure explaining rationale and scope
6.4 Restoration of Standard Governance
Once stabilized, control reverts fully to the standard governance framework.
Emergency mechanisms are not permanent overrides.
7. Future Governance Enhancements
To prevent governance stagnation or dilution-related decline in participation, CICADA Finance may implement:
7.1 Dynamic Quorum (Conceptual Model)
Example framework:
Quorum = max(Base Quorum, Moving Participation Average × Adjustment Factor)
Where:
Base Quorum = governance-defined minimum floor
Moving Participation Average = recent vote participation
Adjustment Factor = stabilizing coefficient
This prevents governance capture in low-turnout periods while maintaining flexibility.
Because CICADA Finance governance history is still limited, this feature is documented but not activated by default.
8. Governance Design Philosophy
CICADA Finance governance is built around:
Participation legitimacy (20% quorum)
Operational efficiency (48h–120h timelock tiering)
Risk containment (multi-sig emergency safeguard)
Long-term adaptability (dynamic mechanisms optional)
Governance is designed not for short-term sentiment swings, but for durable, cycle-resistant protocol evolution.
